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Abstract
Critical nodes—or “middlemen”—have an essential place in both social and economic
networks when considering the flow of information and trade. This paper extends
the concept of critical nodes to directed networks. We identify strong and weak
middlemen.
Node contestability is introduced as a form of competition in networks; a duality
between uncontested intermediaries and middlemen is established. The brokerage
power of middlemen is formally expressed and a general algorithm is constructed
to measure the brokerage power of each node from the networks adjacency matrix.
Augmentations of the brokerage power measure are discussed to encapsulate relevant
centrality measures.
We use these concepts to identify and measure middlemen in two empirical socio-
economic networks, the elite marriage network of Renaissance Florence and Krack-
hardt’s advice network.
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1 The critical role of middlemen in social networks
Recent research has shown that social networks are recognised as important descriptors of
real-life social processes and their analysis as very insightful (Watts, 2004; Jackson, 2008;
Newman, 2010). Node centrality aims to identify the most influential nodes in the network.
This paper makes a contribution to the analysis of nodes that are critical for the flow of
information and trade in a network. Such critical nodes—or “middlemen”—have been solely
considered for undirected networks. Here, we consider these nodes in the general context
of directed networks. We introduce a middleman as a node that can block the information
flow from at least one node to another. If one applies this definition to undirected networks,
one arrives at the standard notion of a middleman as a singleton node cut set. In the context
of directed networks this is no longer the case: Its removal does not necessarily break up
the whole network; it just compromises the information flow for at least one pair of nodes.
In directed networks, the essential brokerage position of middlemen allows them to be
highly extractive to both directly and indirectly connected nodes. On the other hand, their
involvement lowers transaction costs in terms of search and the formation of beneficial
links (Burt, 1992). Examples include financial intermediaries which lower the cost of credit
intermediation; Google which lowers the cost of Internet search and matching through
self-selection; and eBay lowering the cost of economic trade.
Naturally, the existence of middlemen in a directed network is closely related to the
competitive environment represented by that network. Gilles and Diamantaras (2013)
show in a very simple setting that middlemen have the potential to be highly exploitive
given a lack of competition combined with a pessimistic outlook regarding their potential
contestability in a network. The main conclusion from this research is a non-trivial extension
of how economists and social scientists perceive the architecture and dynamics of exchange
systems, how the presence of a middleman can knit a system together, and, as a consequence
of their position, can act as rent-extracting monopolists with excessive bargaining power
(Easley and Kleinberg, 2010, Chapter 11).
We extend these notions to a more general definition of contestability in directed
networks. In a directed network, a node is contested if alternative pathways (“walks”) are
available to establish exchange between pairs of nodes in the network. Our main result
shows that there is a formal duality between the existence of middlemen and network
contestability. In particular, an intermediary node is a middleman if and only if it is
uncontested.
One would expect that betweenness centrality measures would capture the influence
that such middlemen exert. However, we show that this is not the case. Instead, we
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propose a new middleman power measure that exhibits the desired properties. We devise an
algorithm that applies the adjacency matrix of any directed network to identify and measure
the middlemen in that network. We apply this algorithm to study two very well known
(historical) directed networks from the literature. These applications allow us to make
an in-depth comparison with well-established centrality measures such as betweenness
centrality and Bonacich centrality (Bonacich, 1987).
In the Florentine marriage network of the early renaissance (Padgett and Ansell, 1993;
Padgett, 1994), we conclude that our middleman power measure clearly ranks the more
powerful middlemen higher than the less powerful, confirming with historical analysis. In
Krackhardt (1987)’s advice network, again our measure confirms Krackhardt’s original
assessment of the most influential node. Furthermore, we show that, despite the importance
of middlemen in these networks, this positional feature is not properly and fully identified
by conventional centrality measures.
Relationship with the existing literature. Middlemen have been investigated in both
sociology and economics during the past three decades. The specific interest in economics
was initiated by Kalai, Postlewaite, and Roberts (1978) who investigated the payoffs
to middlemen in an intermediated trade environment. These insights were extended by
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) who applied them to a model of market search. Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) and Gilles, Chakrabarti, Sarangi, and Badasyan (2006) further analysed
middlemen in the context of economic interaction.
Many of the general findings in the economics literature have been independently
verified in the social sciences. In social network analysis, middlemen are seen as social
actors that bridge structural holes in the social fabric. Due to their position these middlemen
have access to more diverse information; are able to broker information and ideas between
agents and affiliations; will have a tendency to be more entrepreneurial; are able to exploit
their intermediating opportunities; and have better ideas which are then evaluated by others
within a society or organisation (Burt, 1992, 2004, 2005, 2010). Moreover, by virtue of
their weak ties in the network, middlemen are able to exploit unique opportunities that are
not afforded to other, more socially embedded, nodes in the network (Granovetter, 1973,
2005).
Despite the wide acknowledgement within social network analysis of the significance
of middlemen, centrality measures do not necessarily identify these critical nodes as being
important even though their removal may deteriorate the functionality of the network as a
whole. As the notion of centrality came to the fore, Freeman (1979, p. 219) argued that
central nodes were those “in the thick of things”. To exemplify this, he used an undirected
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star network consisting of five nodes. The middle node, at the centre of the star, has three
advantages over the other nodes: It has more ties; it can reach all the others more quickly;
and it controls the flow between the others. Freeman developed three simple measures of
node centrality based on the prevalent features of the centre node: degree, closeness and
betweenness.
More complex centrality measures have been proposed. Bonacich (1972) proposed
the use of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix as the basis for the measurement
of network centrality. This measure expresses the idea that a node is more central if it is
connected to nodes that are themselves central. Other measures, including Katz centrality
(Katz, 1953) take advantage of the same mechanism as Bonacich centrality by analysing the
number of all nodes that a given node can be connected through a path, while contributions
from linking distant nodes are progressively penalised. A node has a larger centrality if it
has neighbours with a high Katz centrality. PageRank (Brin and Page, 1998) is a variant of
Katz centrality, which recently gained application to the World Wide Web.
The most common centrality measures do not provide a proper account of network
power and, usually, overlook middlemen. Two exceptions are noted: First, the β-measure
(Brink and Gilles, 1994, 2000) is founded on an axiomatic approach to measuring centrality.
This measure is one of a few that measures dominance, and therefore power, in directed
networks. Applications are mainly focussed on how nodes are dominated by others in
hierarchical organisations. Second, Bozzo, Franceschet, and Rinaldi (2013) provide both a
vulnerability and power measure based on the number of nodes that can be victimised by
so-called “executioners”. The power of a node set is comparable to how integral the set is
to the robustness of an undirected network.
Outline of the paper. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the required
preliminaries for our analysis and introduces two strong and weak middlemen in directed
networks. Section 3 considers the notion of network contestability, which is shown to be the
dual notion to that of middlemen. Section 4 provides a measure of middleman power, which
assigns a quantitative expression to a node’s brokerage power; non-middlemen always
attain a zero network power score. The final section investigates two empirical case studies
of social networks where middlemen have tended to have a degree of importance.
2 Middlemen as critical nodes
Our initial discussion focusses on the definition of a critical node in a directed network. We
prefer to denote critical nodes as middlemen. We introduce middlemen in relation to the
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connectivity in a network. We identify two related notions of middlemen, denoted as strong
and weak middlemen depending on their network position.
2.1 Network preliminaries
A directed network is a pair (N,D) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of nodes and
D ⊂ {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N and i , j} is a set of arcs, being directed relationships from one node
to another. Note that (i, i) < D for any i ∈ N, which is a technical requirement.1 We denote
a directed network (N,D) by D unless N is ambiguous. Also, we denote (i, j) ∈ D by i j.
We next introduce some auxiliary concepts in directed networks.
Walks: A walk from i to j in a directed network D—or, simply, a (i, j)-walk—is a set of
connected nodes Wi j(D) = {i1, . . . , im} ⊂ N with m ≥ 3, i1 = i, im = j, and ikik+1 ∈ D for
every k = 1, . . . ,m − 1. Therefore, a walk is a sequence of adjacent nodes in the network.
Walks might revisit nodes and, therefore, might contain loops.
In many cases there are multiple walks from i to j in a directed network D. If this is
required, we denote Wvi j(D) as the v
th distinct walk from i to j in D.
The classWi j(D) = {W1i j(D), . . . ,WVi j (D)} consists of all distinct walks from i to j in D,
where V is the number of distinct walks. Wi j(D) = ∅ denotes that there is no walk from i
to j in D.
Connectedness: Nodes i, j ∈ N are strongly connected if Wi j(D) , ∅ as well as
W ji(D) , ∅. A directed network D is strongly connected if Wi j , ∅ and W ji , ∅
for all nodes i, j ∈ N.
Node i is weakly connected to j if Wi j(D) , ∅. A directed network D is weakly
connected if for all i, j ∈ N either i is weakly connected to j, or j is weakly connected to i,
or both. Clearly, strongly connected networks are always weakly connected.
A subset M ⊂ N is a weakly connected component of D if (M,DM) with DM =
D ∩ (M × M) is weakly connected and and there is no i ∈ N \ M with (M + i,DM+i) being
weakly connected.
Successors and predecessors: IfWi j(D) , ∅ then j is called the successor of i and i is
called the predecessor of j in D.
For i ∈ N we define si(D) = { j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ D} being all of the direct successors of
i in D, and pi(D) = { j ∈ N | ( j, i) ∈ D} being all the direct predecessors of i in D. The
1An undirected network can be interpreted as a directed network (N,D) such that all arcs are reciprocated:
(i, j) ∈ D if and only if ( j, i) ∈ D.
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out-degree of i is given by d+i = #si(D) and its in-degree by d
−
i = #pi(D). Now, i’s overall
degree is given by di = d+i + d
−
i ≡ #{si(D) ∪ pi(D)}.
We introduce S i(D) = { j ∈ N | Wi j(D) , ∅} as i’s successor set. Node k is an indirect
successor of i in D if k ∈ S i(D) \ si(D). Furthermore, we introduce a modified successor
set by S i(D) = S i(D) ∪ {i}.
Likewise, Pi(D) = { j ∈ N | W ji(D) , ∅} denotes i’s predecessor set. Again, node k
is an indirect predecessor of i in D if k ∈ Pi(D) \ pi(D). Analogous to the above, we let
Pi(D) = Pi(D) ∪ {i}.
We can also represent the position of a node in the network through a pair-based
description. The coverage of node i in D is the set of all pairs of nodes that i intermediates,
i.e., all pairs ( j.h) ∈ Pi(D) × S i(D). Similarly, the reach of node i in D is defined by all
pairs (i, j) with j ∈ S i(D).
The node set N can be partitioned into three disjoint subsets: sources, sinks, and
intermediaries. Node i is a source if d−i = 0 and d
+
i > 1; i is a sink if d
−
i > 1 and d
+
i = 0;
and i in an intermediary if d−i > 1 and d
+
i > 1.
Finally, we let D − i represent the network obtained by deleting the node i from the
network D. This is equivalent to
D − i = {( j, h) | j, h ∈ N \ {i} such that ( j, h) ∈ D }. (1)
2.2 Connectivity and middlemen
We identify critical nodes as those having the ability to broker information flows in a
network. Following Gilles, Chakrabarti, Sarangi, and Badasyan (2006), a critical node in
an undirected network can disrupt and manipulate the typical operations on a network by
disconnecting two or more nodes—which is equivalent to the property that removing a
critical node partitions a given network into multiple disconnected components.
Here, we extend this concept to directed networks. In this context our definition focusses
on the disruption of connectivity of two nodes.
Definition 2.1 Let (N,D) be a directed network and let i, j, h ∈ N be three distinct nodes.
(a) The node h is an (i, j)-middleman ifWi j(D) , ∅ and
h ∈ ∩Wi j(D) = W1i j(D) ∩ · · · ∩WVi j (D), (2)
where V > 1 is the number of walks from i to j. Here, Mi j(D) ≡ ∩Wi j(D) denotes
the (i, j)-middleman set containing all (i, j)-middlemen.
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(b) The middleman set for D is the set of all middlemen in D given by
M(D) =
⋃
i, j∈N : i, j
Mi j(D) (3)
Node h is a middleman if h ∈ M(D) and h is a non-middleman if h < M(D).
A middleman is an intermediary node that is a member of all walks between at least
two other nodes within a given network. Therefore, a middleman brokers the flow of all
information between at least two nodes. Obviously, a middleman connects two or more
agents that would not be connected otherwise. Indeed, by definition Mi j(D) , ∅ if and only
ifWi j(D) , ∅.
Converse to a middleman, a non-middleman is an intermediary that if removed from
the network does not affect the connectivity of any two or more other nodes and, therefore,
does not impose a negative externality on other nodes when removed.
The following properties can be deduced directly from the above definition.
Proposition 2.2 Let D be a directed network on the node set N = {1, . . . , n}.
(i) Every middleman i ∈ M(D) is an intermediary in D.
(ii) If n < 3, there might exist intermediaries, but there are no middlemen.
(iii) For n > 3 and i ∈ N, pi(D) ⊂
[
p j(D) ∪ { j}
]
for every direct successor j ∈ si(D)
implies that i < M(D).
(iv) For all i, j ∈ N with j ∈ si(D) it holds that Mi, j(D) = ∅.
This implies that the complete directed network has no middlemen.
(v) Every middleman i ∈ M(D) has a local clustering co-efficient of less than 1.
(vi) If D is undirected in the sense that (i, j) ∈ D if and only if ( j, i) ∈ D, then
Mi j(D) = M ji(D) for all i, j ∈ N.
From (vi), in an undirected network a node is a middleman if it rests on all walks from node
i to node j. This means that the removal of a middleman disrupts the any communication
between nodes j and i. Hence, a middleman indeed is a singleton cut set in an undirected
network, as traditionally understood.
On the other hand, in a directed network, a middleman rests on all walks from node i to
node j, but does not have to rest on all walks from j to i. This implies that given the removal
of a middleman in a directed network the interaction from i to j will become disconnected,
but the interaction from node j to node i may still be present. Indeed, even with the removal
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Figure 1: Acyclic directed network, D, highlighting strong, weak, and non-middlemen.
of a middleman in a directed network, nodes i and j can still remain weakly connected. This
insight motivates a further refinement of the notion of a middleman in a directed network.
Definition 2.3 Let D be a weakly connected directed network on node set N = {1, . . . , n}
with n > 3.
(a) A middleman h ∈ M(D) is a strong middleman in D if the network D − h contains
two or more weakly connected components.
(b) A middleman h ∈ M(D) is a weak middleman in D if network D − h does not
contain two or more weakly connected components.
Weak middlemen exist in both cyclic and acyclic directed networks. Example 2.4 highlights
the existence of both weak and strong middlemen in an acyclic network.
Example 2.4 Consider a directed network D on the node set N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, which
is depicted in Figure 1. In the network, node 1 is a source, node 7 is a sink, and nodes
2,3,4,5, and 6 are intermediaries.
We can determine that M(D) = {2, 5, 6}, where nodes 2 and 5 are weak middlemen and
node 6 is a strong middleman. For an explanation first consider node 2. Node 2 lies on
all walks from node 1 to node 4, therefore 2 ∈ M1,4(D) andW1,4(D − 2) = ∅. However,
D − 2 remains weakly connected meaning that node 2 must be a weak middleman. An
analogous argument could be made for node 5 because 5 ∈ M3,6(D)∩M3,7(D) and, therefore,
W3,6(D − 5) =W3,7(D − 5) = ∅. Moreover, D − 5 is weakly connected.
Finally, 6 ∈ M1,7(D) ∩ M2,7(D) ∩ M3,7(D) ∩ M4,7(D) ∩ M5,7(D). Indeed, node 6 is the sole
broker of all interaction to node 7. In the network D−6 there emerge two weakly connected
components: {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and {7}.
All other intermediaries are non-middlemen. Indeed, even the removal of either node 3 or 4
does not affect the connectivity in the network.2 
2It is worth noting that if all arcs were reciprocated in network D from Figure 1 to form an undirected
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Theorem 2.5 below naturally leads from the insights resulting in Definition 2.3 and Exam-
ple 2.4.
Theorem 2.5 Every middleman in an undirected network is a strong middleman.
Proof. Without loss of generality we can restrict ourselves to connected undirected networks
only. First note that every connected undirected network is a strongly connected directed
network D with i j ∈ D if and only if ji ∈ D and there exists at least one walk from i to j for
all i , j.
Therefore, consider a strongly connected directed network (N,D) where #N = n > 3.
According to Definition 2.1, a node h ∈ N is a middleman if it rests on all walks between
at least two other nodes, say i and j. Since Wi j(D) = W ji(D), the property that h ∈⋂
i, j∈NWi j(D) implies that h ∈ ⋂i, j∈NW ji(D).
Thus, in D − h all walks from j to i are disconnected. This in turn implies that i and
j cannot be weakly connected and D − h must contain at least two weakly connected
components, separating i and j in different components. This implies that h is actually a
strong middleman in D.
It should be intuitive why Theorem 2.5 holds. Weak middlemen exist in directed networks
due to the distinction between weakly connected and strongly connected nodes. The
distinction collapses in an equivalent undirected network as all nodes are effectively strongly
connected. This implies the following.
Corollary 2.6 Weak middlemen only exist in directed networks.
The distinction between weak and strong middlemen is natural and enhances our under-
standing of the functionality of directed versus undirected networks. We enhance this
understanding further in the following discussion that allows the measurement of middle-
man control, in which it is shown that weak middlemen can actually be more powerful than
strong middlemen.
3 Contestability in directed networks
Next we examine the relationship between critical nodes and competition in networks.
Based on the model of network competition in Gilles and Diamantaras (2013), such
competition rests on the ability of actors to circumvent intermediaries in their pursuit of
network, nodes 2 and 5 would no longer be middlemen. However, node 6 would still be a strong middleman
and would subsequently broker twice as many interactions, i.e. all connections to node 7 and all connections
from node 7 to the rest of the network.
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value-generating interaction. Thus, competition in a network is understood as the ability to
prevent an intermediary from becoming a middleman.
In directed networks, contestability is modelled as the ability of a group of nodes to
service the coverage of an intermediary, given by the product of the nodes’ predecessor
and successor set. A node is contested by other nodes if this group of nodes can cover all
connections facilitated by that node.
Definition 3.1 Let D be a directed network on node set N = {1, . . . , n} where n > 3 and let
i ∈ N.
(a) Node i is contested by node set Ci ⊂ N if i < Ci and it holds that
Pi(D) × S i(D) ⊆
⋃
j∈Ci
(
P j(D − i) × S j(D − i)
)
. (4)
(b) Node i is directly contested by j , i if the singleton node set { j} contests i in D.
(c) Node i is uncontested if there are no sets of nodes that contest i.
There may exist multiple node sets that contest i in a network D. This justifies the introduc-
tion of a class Ci(D) ⊂ 2N of such contesting node sets. Furthermore, a minimal contesting
node set is given by C∗i (D) ∈ arg min{#Ci | Ci ∈ Ci}.
Corollary 3.2 A node i is directly contested by node j in network D if and only if
Pi(D) ⊆ P j(D − i) ∪ { j} and S i(D) ⊆ S j(D − i) ∪ { j}. (5)
The corollary states the explicit nature of contestation in a network in that a node can
completely take over the functionality of the contested node. Thus, node i is directly
contested by node j only when all of node i’s predecessor set can be connected to i’s
successor set either through or from node j when i is removed from the network. The exact
same intuition is used with respect to contestation by a group of nodes.
Example 3.3 We consider a network to illustrate the notion of contestability. Consider
directed network D on node set N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} shown in Figure 1 on page 7. Table 1
below provides the predecessor and successor sets of all nodes in the network.
Using this information we deduce that intermediaries 3 and 4 are contested, whereas
intermediaries 2, 5, and 6 are uncontested.
Here, node 3 is contested by node 2: The predecessor set of node 3 is given by P3(D) = {1} ≡
P2(D) and the successor set of node 3 is given by S 3(D) = {5, 6, 7} ⊂ S 2(D) = {4, 5, 6, 7}. It
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Node Predecessor Set Successor Set
1 P1(D) = ∅ S 1(D) = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
2 P2(D) = {1} S 2(D) = {4, 5, 6, 7}
3 P3(D) = {1} S 3(D) = {5, 6, 7}
4 P4(D) = {1, 2} S 4(D) = {6, 7}
5 P5(D) = {1, 2, 3} S 5(D) = {6, 7}
6 P6(D) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} S 6(D) = {7}
7 P7(D) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} S 7(D) = ∅
Table 1: Predecessor and successor sets of nodes in Figure 1
is also true that P3(D) ⊆ P2(D−3)∪{2} = {1, 2} and S 3(D) ⊆ S 2(D−3)∪{2} = {2, 4, 5, 6, 7}.
This case introduces what can be denoted as asymmetric contestability, meaning that
although node i contests node j, it may not be true that node j contests node i. Here, node 2
directly contests by node 3, although node 2 is not directly contested by node 3. Only in
rare cases will there exist symmetric contestability where node i contests node j and node j
contests node i. 
The next example highlights group contestability where a highly connected node asym-
metrically contests two others, while these two nodes in turn contest the highly connected
node.
Example 3.4 Consider directed network D′ on node set N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, shown in
Figure 2, where M(D′) = ∅. Here, node 4 connects nodes 1 and 2 to nodes 5 and 6, and
therefore directly contests node 2 while not being directly contested by any other individual
node. However, node 4 is not a middleman and indeed the set C = {2, 3} contests node 4.
Clearly, the coverage and reach of nodes 2 and 3 encapsulate the coverage of node 4.
Therefore, although nodes 2 and 3 do not contest node 4 individually, the node set C = {2, 3}
contests node 4. Indeed, the condition for group contestability holds:
P4(D) × S 4(D) ⊂
(
P2(D − 4) × S 2(D − 4)
)
∪
(
P3(D − 4) × S 3(D − 4)
)
. (6)
If node 4 is removed from the network its function can be fully replaced by the combination
of nodes 2 and 3 and therefore all other nodes that were connected can still be connected in
the same way. 
Example 3.4 highlights the requirement for P j(D − i) used in the definition of contestability
instead of the predecessor set, P j(D − i), only. Consider the network in Figure 2. As
noted, there exist no middlemen and all intermediaries are contested given the definition of
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Figure 2: Network D′ where node set C = {2, 3} contests node 4.
contestability provided above. With a more restricted definition it would be seen that node
4 would not be a contested intermediary and also not a middleman. The more elaborative
version provided in Definition 3.1 adjusts for predecessors of a given node, i, that can
connect to the successors of i, therefore fulfilling the same function and thus contesting i.
Examples 3.3 and 3.4 give an indication that if an intermediary is contested, it cannot
be a middleman. For example, in Figure 1 agent 3 is a non-middleman because his function
is directly contested by the presence of node 2, and node 2 is a middleman because its
function is not contested by any other node in the network.
Our main result states that there is a duality between contestation and the presence of
critical nodes.
Theorem 3.5 Consider any directed network (N,D) with n > 3. Then:
(i) Every middleman i ∈ M(D) is uncontested.
(ii) If an intermediary i ∈ N is uncontested, then it must be a middleman, i.e., i ∈ M(D).
Proof. Let (N,D) be a directed network with n > 3.
Proof of (i): The condition for contestability stated in equation (4) on page 9 states that a
node h ∈ N is contested in network D if its coverage—determined by the pairs of nodes that
it intermediates—is a subset of the coverage plus the reach of the nodes in Ch ⊂ N \ {h}.
Now consider an intermediary i in D that is contested by a set of agents, Ci ⊂ N \ {i}.
Since i is contested, it must be true that all of i’s predecessors can be connected to all of
i’s successors by a walk that does not include i. Therefore, i cannot be a middleman. This
implies the assertion that every middleman is uncontested.
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Proof of (ii): Consider an intermediary h ∈ N who is uncontested in the network D. Then
h’s coverage is not a subset of the coverage of any set of nodes plus the respective reach of
each of these nodes. This implies that h itself has to rest on at least one walk that no other
nodes in the network rest on when h is removed from the network. Hence, in the network
D there exists at least one pair of nodes, say i to j, with h ∈ ∩Wi j(D) andWi j(D − h) = ∅.
This implies that h is actually a middleman concerning the walks from i to j.
From this assertion all middlemen are never contested; if a node is contested then all of
its intermediation functions can be replaced by the coverage of other nodes. From this,
it is contended that a middleman is an intermediary that has a unique function and is, in
some way, more effective than non-middlemen with respect to their connectivity and thus
coverage in the network.
Relationship with market competition. Considering an economic network in which all
nodes produce an homogeneous output, the notion of contestability is linked to that of
market competition. Traditional market theory contends that one agent competes against
another if they produce the same output and subsequently sell this output to the same set of
consumers. If two or more agents operate in a given market with access to the same set
of suppliers and the same consumers, then all consumers could technically be supplied by
another agent if one of the agents were removed from the network, or failed due to some
exogenous shock.
Bertrand competition suggests that firms producing an homogenous output will be
prone to compete with each other with respect to the price attached to their respective
outputs (Edgeworth, 1925). Much of the analysis in market competition in economics
has derived from this simple concept. Firms operating in this way will have no market
power; potentially a price above the long-term marginal cost would be unsustainable since
a competitor will be able to undercut it. Our notion of contestability is related to Bertrand
competition in the sense that, if a given node is contested, its coverage and functions are
contested, meaning that a contested node has no power in the network.3
4 Measuring Middleman power
A middleman occupies a critical position in a network since her removal disconnects at least
two or more agents and, in the most extreme case, might have the ability to separate the
3Note that if all nodes provided a heterogeneous output then the notion of contestability and market
competition breaks down. Furthermore, if we were to assume that all agents had highly differentiated
information and ideas then individual nodes could technically not contest one another since they would all
perform different functions and provide different insights into the network; indeed, all nodes will be unique.
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network into multiple disconnected components. Therefore, it seems logical to ask how we
can measure this power. After examining established measures, we propose a measure of
middleman power based on the disconnections that emerge when middlemen are removed
from the network.
4.1 Betweenness centrality and middlemen
We first examine whether betweenness centrality could be a tool to assess middleman power.
Betweenness centrality was proposed independently by Anthonisse (1971) for edges and
rephrased by Freeman (1977) for nodes in undirected networks. White and Borgatti (1994)
proposed an extension to directed networks.
This measure seems specifically relevant since it explicitly considers the role of a node
in connecting other nodes in the network. It may be expected that the betweenness centrality
score of a node provides an indication of what nodes are middlemen by having a greater
betweenness centrality than non-middlemen in the network.
To define the betweenness centrality measure, let pi(h j) be the number of shortest
walks—or geodesics—from node h to node j. Furthermore, let pii(k j) be the number of
geodesics that pass through node i. Betweenness centrality is now defined as
BCi(D) =
∑
h, j,i : pi(h j),0
pii(h j)
pi(h j)
(7)
Equation (7) indicates that a middleman i between nodes k and j would always have a
high betweenness centrality since by Definition 2.1 a middleman is on all walks between
these two nodes. However, this formulation only considers geodesics. As the next example
illustrates, the betweenness centrality of non-middlemen may even exceed the betweenness
centrality of middlemen.
Example 4.1 Consider the acyclic directed network D′′ depicted in Figure 3.
Here M(D′′) = {4, 5, 6}, and nodes 7 and 8 are contested intermediaries. All middlemen
have the same non-normalised betweenness centrality measures due to their equivalent
positions: BC4(D′′) = BC5(D′′) = BC6(D′′) = 4. However, both contested intermediaries
have larger non-normalised betweenness centrality scores: BC7(D′′) = BC8(D′′) = 6.
In the underlying undirected network, U′′, where all arcs in D′′ are reciprocated, the
non-middlemen still have a higher betweenness centrality than middlemen: BC4(U′′) =
BC5(U′′) = BC6(U′′) = 16.4 and BC7(U′′) = BC8(U′′) = 25. Table 2 provides a com-
parison of common centrality measures all of which indicate that nodes 7 and 8 are more
central, therefore underrating the nodes with powerful middleman properties. 
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Figure 3: The directed network D′′ considered in Example 4.1.
Node Degree PageRank Betweenness Closeness Bonacich β-Measure
1 1 0.112 0.000 0.360 0.328 0.333
2 1 0.112 0.000 0.360 0.328 0.333
3 1 0.112 0.000 0.360 0.328 0.333
4 3 0.330 0.456 0.474 1.047 1.400
5 3 0.330 0.456 0.474 1.047 1.400
6 3 0.330 0.456 0.474 1.047 1.400
7 4 0.480 0.694 0.692 1.565 2.000
8 4 0.480 0.694 0.692 1.565 2.000
9 2 0.297 0.011 0.474 0.863 0.400
10 2 0.297 0.011 0.474 0.863 0.400
Table 2: Centrality results for the undirected network U′′
This deficiency concerning the identification and measure of middlemen, highlighted in
Figure 3 and Table 2, extends to other less common centrality measures. Indeed, no
measure for undirected networks specifically identifies and highlights middlemen, instead
the measures tend to over-inflate the power and importance of contested intermediaries in
networks.
The reason for the high betweenness centrality of non-middlemen, for example, is
because of the underlying assumptions of the measure. First, only geodesic paths are
counted between two given nodes, and the second is that these geodesic paths are considered
to have an equal weight. The combination of these assumptions implies that the betweenness
centrality measure does not necessarily measure the “power” of a node in negotiating
between two others.
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4.2 A middleman power measure
We provide a mechanism to identify middlemen and quantify their brokerage power in
a meaningful way from basic information regarding the topology of the network. The
proposed measure counts the disconnections that emerge when a given node is removed
from the network.
Let D be a directed network on node set N = {1, . . . , n} and let i ∈ N be an arbitrary
node. The brokerage of node i is quantified as
bi(D) =
∑
j∈N
#S j(D) −
∑
j,i
#S j(D − i) − #S i(D) − #Pi(D). (8)
Note that the successor set of a node contains all other nodes that can be reached by a
directed walk from the node. The first part of Equation 8,
∑
j∈N #S j(D), counts the total
number of successors of all n nodes in the network. Hence, it provides an indication of the
total connectivity of the network as a whole.
Given the intuition of the first part of the equation, it can be implied that the second part,∑
j,i #S j(D − i), refers to the total connectivity of the network when node i is removed. We
remark that
∑
j∈N #S j(D) >
∑
j,i #S j(D− i) if di(D) > 1, and ∑ j∈N #S j(D) = ∑ j,i #S j(D− i)
if di = 0.
Thus,
∑
j∈N #S j(D) − ∑ j,i #S j(D − i) expresses the connectivity differential between
the full network D and the subnetwork D − i. The connectivity differential captures two
features: (1) The direct connectivity of node i in terms of its successor and predecessor set.
Indeed, the larger the predecessor and successor sets of node i the larger the differential
will be regardless of whether i is a middleman or not. (2) The lost connectivity to other
nodes not including i.
When considering the impact of a middleman, we are only interested in the lost connec-
tivity (2) and, therefore, we compensate the connectivity differential with the connectivity
of i in the network. Specifically, the predecessor set and successor set of node i is removed
from the connectivity differential, thus adjusting for (1) and resulting in Equation 8 above.
The brokerage of a node therefore counts the number of third-party disconnections that
occur due to the removal of a node; or in other words, counts the number of (i, j)-middleman
sets that a node is a member of.
If bi(D) = 0 then the removal of i from the network makes no change to the network’s
connectivity—when compensating for the connectivity of i. Hence, all nodes that are
connected by a directed walk in D can still be connected in D− i. In essence, compensating
for their connection to i in D, the number of successors of all j nodes is the same in D − i
as in D.
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On the other hand, if bi(D) > 1, there exists at least one pair of connected nodes that
are now not connected in D − i, and i must be a middleman.
We normalise the brokerage of a node by calculating the total number of potential opportu-
nities for brokerage in the network. Brokerage—and, therefore, middleman positions—can
only emerge if a pair of nodes are a minimum distance of two or more away from each
other. Intuitively, by calculating the indirect successors of all nodes in the network, the total
number of brokerage opportunities can be derived.
The set of indirect successors of i in D is given by S i(D) \ si(D). Therefore, the number
indirect successors for node i is given by #S i(D)−#si(D). Given this, the maximal potential
brokerage in D is computed as
B′(D) =
∑
i∈N
[#S i(D) − #si(D)] . (9)
By normalising a node’s brokerage score, the middleman power of a node can be defined.
Definition 4.2 Let D be a directed network on node set N. The middleman power of node
i ∈ N is given as
νi(D) =
bi(D)
B(D)
, (10)
where B(D) = max{B′(D), 1}.
Empty and complete networks have to be assigned an artificial normalisation factor of unity
as they would otherwise have no brokerage opportunities.
A middleman has a network power of 1 if it brokers all potential opportunities in the
network. This includes nodes at the center of star networks; however, even if some of the
leaf nodes form a connection between each other, the middleman power of the centre node
remains 1.
The next example explicitly computes the middleman power for an undirected star and
a directed cycle.
Example 4.3 Figure 4 shows an undirected star, D?, and a directed cycle, D◦, where
n = 6 in both networks. For an arbitrary undirected star network, D?, where n > 3,
bi(D?) = (n−1)(n−2) for the centre node, and b j(D?) = 0 for all other nodes. The potential
brokerage for an undirected star is computed as B(D?) = (n − 1)(n − 2). Therefore, the
middleman power of the centre node is νi(D?) =
(n−1)(n−2)
(n−1)(n−2) = 1.
Next, consider a directed cycle D◦ for arbitrary n > 3. Each node has an in-degree of
1 and an out-degree of 1, implying that all nodes are middlemen. We now derive that
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Figure 4: Undirected network (D?) and directed cycle (D◦).
b1(D◦) = . . . = bn(D◦) =
(n−1)(n−2)
2 . The number of potential brokerage opportunities is
B(D◦) = n(n−2), implying νi = n−12n for all i ∈ N where n > 3. In particular, for the depicted
case of n = 6: νi = 512 ∀i ∈ N. 
We derive several properties for the middleman power measure stated in (10).
Theorem 4.4 Let D be a network on node set N = {1, . . . , n}.
(i) For any contested intermediary, νi(D) = 0.
(ii) For any network 0 6 νi 6 1 for all i ∈ N.
Proof.
Proof of (i): Theorem 3.5 asserts a duality between a contested intermediary and a non-
middleman. Definition 2.1 implies that an intermediary k is not a middleman if there is no
pair i, j ∈ N with i , j such that k lies on all walks from i to j in D. Hence, k < ∩Wi, j(D)
for all i, j ∈ N with i , j.
Since k is an intermediary it holds that #Pk(D) > 0, #S k(D) > 0 as well as
∑
i∈N #S i(D) >∑
i∈N−k #S i(D − k) since the nodes in D − k can obviously not connect to k. Also, since the
connectivity of the network D is not affected by the removal of node k, it holds that the
removal of k only affects the connectivity with k itself. Hence,
∑
i∈N #S i(D)−∑i∈N−k #S i(D−
k) = #S k(D) + #Pk(D). Therefore, bk(D) = 0, implying that νk = 0.
Proof of (ii): We omit a mathematical proof of (ii), due to its tedious nature. Instead, we
provide an intuitive, more descriptive reasoning.
A middleman cannot take advantage of more than all brokerage opportunities present in a
network; therefore B′(D) > bi(D), implying νi(D) 6 1.4
4Only in a network where a middleman rests on all geodesic walks of length two, for example an undirected
star, it holds that B′(D) = bi(D).
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Furthermore, neither bi(D) < 0 nor B(D) < 0. The minimum brokerage of some node k is in
an empty network where #S k(D) = #Pk(D) = 0. In that case,
∑
i∈N #S i(D) =
∑
i,k #S i(D−k)
since k has no connectivity in the network. Therefore, νi(D) > 0 for any node i ∈ N.
For large directed networks the calculation of the middleman power measure of a node
can be tedious. The appendix to this paper contains a two-step algorithm based on the
adjacency matrix of a directed network to identify middlemen and compute the middleman
power measure of each node in an arbitrary directed network.
Distance-based brokerage
We extend our discussion of the criticality of nodes with a measure that combines middleman
power with node proximity. Consider a directed network D on N and i, j, h ∈ N with
h ∈ Mi j(D). The brokerage power of middleman h could be less effective due to the
geodesic distance from i to j.
Consider an amended brokerage score to capture this effect given by
∆i j(h) =
1
δih
· 1
δh j
, (11)
where δi j is the geodesic distance from i to j in D. Here, nodes closer to h provide a greater
brokerage power to node h than those at larger distances. Indeed, h receives maximal
brokerage power if i ∈ ph(D) and j ∈ sh(D).
Now a distance based middleman power measure for h ∈ M(D) can be introduced as
ν∗h(D) =
∑
i, j∈N : h∈Mi j(D)
∆i j(h). (12)
Reassessing the directed network in Figure 1, the distance-based middleman power measure
provides a convergence of the middleman power scores for the nodes: ν∗6(D) = 3
1
3 ; ν
∗
5(D) =
112 ; ν
∗
2(D) = 1; ν
∗
1(D) = ν
∗
3(D) = ν
∗
4(D) = ν
∗
7(D) = 0.
It may be particularly beneficial to use this modified measure to assess costly trade in
a network or the diffusion of information that can degrade as it is being passed through a
network. This assumption of information degradation and even complete truncation over a
certain distance has been widely used in literature regarding social networks (Jackson and
Rogers, 2005; Jackson, 2008).
We note that the middleman power measure should not be considered as a replacement for
other centrality measures—it is itself not just a measure of centrality—rather it identifies
a certain type of node in a network and measures brokerage. Instead, the measure can be
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Figure 5: Directed network of Florentine marriages, circa 1434
complimented with other measures of centrality. The above example of distance-based
brokerage is one of many augmentations that makes use of closeness centrality.
5 An application to two empirical networks
In this section we apply our two middleman power measures to two well-known social
networks. From the assessment of these networks we provide a discussion regarding the
potential of middlemen in these networks. The results of middleman power are compared
with other measures of centrality. This is done in terms of reference; we refrain from
correlating the results of these measures because we showed above that middleman power
measures different aspects of a node than other measures.
5.1 The elite Florentine marriage network
The investigation of the marriage network of Renaissance Florence has been extensively
used to assess many centrality measures (Newman, 2003; Borgatti, 2005). We apply our
analysis of critical nodes to this network as well.
Although it has been shown previously that the Medici family have the highest degree,
closeness, and betweenness centralities, their importance and power in the socio-economic
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network—as explained by de Roover (1963), Padgett (1994) and Goldthwaite (2009)—is
derived from their ability to access diverse sources of information between separate factions
of the Florentine elite and subsequently broker relationships between families. Powerful
brokerage opportunities emerged due to the inherent “network disjunctures within the elite”
(Padgett and Ansell, 1993, p.1259). In particular, Padgett and Ansell (1993) show that
Cosimo de’Medici was able to gain access to, and control, the flow of diverse information
between opposing political factions and also between families in the same faction. Thus, a
middleman position allowed the Medici family to attain power within Florentine society;
especially, the Medici’s ability to act as broker between a large number of families crossing
opposing political factions.
Unlike more recent renditions of the Florentine marriage network, we represent this
network as a directed graph: An arc from family i to family j represents a female from
family i married into family j. The intuition for this representation is that families were
strategically married in order to build trust, inherit wealth, property, and business, as well
as influence the political and economic decisions of other families. Information will have
flowed through these relationships. Moreover, the nodes are coloured depending on the
factions that the families were affiliated: red nodes are families affiliated with the Medician
faction, and blue nodes are families affiliated with the opposing Oligarch faction 5.
We analyse the resulting directed network in Figure 5 using in-degree (d−) and out-
degree (d+), Bonacich (1987) eigenvector centrality with a β of 0.4 (E), betweenness
centrality (BC), raw middleman power (ν) and distance-based middleman power (ν∗)
presented in Table 3. In this table, (*) denotes a weak middleman and (**) denotes a strong
middleman.
Assessing the marriage network with our middleman power measure highlights the
Medici family as a strong middleman, along with the prominent Albizzi, Salviati, and
Guadagni families. Clearly, the Medici family broker substantially more relationships
than the next rival family, the Guadagni, and therefore control the flow of information and
influence between more families. Moreover, it could be that the Medici would be able to
control interactions in the form of marriages and economic trade between factions that may
integrate them and subsequently lessen the Medici’s critical position in the network.
The betweenness centrality measure ranks the Medici family as the most central in the
network. The measure favours middlemen thus typically ranking them higher; however
there is an exception: although the Tornabuon family are not middlemen they have a higher
betweenness centrality than the Salviati and Peruzzi families.
5The data was initially gathered by Kent (1978) and a blockmodel network was constructed by Padgett
and Ansell (1993). The network provided in Figure 5 is derived from these studies. Both provide an extremely
rich analysis of the elite in Florence at this time.
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Family d−i (d
+
i ) Ei BCi νi ν
∗
i
Medici(**) 3 (3) 1.756 0.376 0.586 0.223
Salviati(**) 1 (1) 0.275 0.066 0.103 0.064
Pazzi 1 (0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Acciaiuol 0 (1) 0.977 0.000 0.000 0.000
Barbadori 0 (2) 1.549 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ridolfi(*) 2 (1) 0.977 0.264 0.414 0.092
Tornabuon 1 (2) 1.359 0.102 0.000 0.033
Albizzi(**) 2 (1) 0.694 0.149 0.095 0.033
Ginori 0 (1) 0.552 0.000 0.000 0.000
Castellan(*) 2 (1) 0.743 0.069 0.086 0.044
Strozzi(*) 2 (2) 1.169 0.245 0.371 0.112
Bischeri(*) 1 (2) 1.246 0.203 0.319 0.090
Peruzzi(*) 2 (1) 0.571 0.049 0.077 0.022
Guadagni(**) 2 (2) 1.048 0.269 0.422 0.130
Lambertes 1 (0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 3: Measuring the importance of Florentine families (1429 – 1434)
Unsurprisingly, the Bonacich centrality measure also ranks the Medici family highly,
but also ranks many non-middlemen highly; specifically the Barbadori family. From the
network topology alone there is no indication to suggest that the Barbadori family should
have had a prominent role in the Florenine elite. Although the Medici rank highly with this
measure, the relevance of an eigenvector centrality measure is questionable: there is no
real reason to believe why the importance of a family would come from its degree and the
degree of its neighbours alone.
There are three further points to note. First, if the marriage network were converted
into its undirected form, the Medici retains its middleman position maintaining the highest
middleman power. Second, the Medici would also retain the highest ranking if the direction
of the relationships were inverted. Third, Padgett and Ansell (1993) and Padgett and
McLean (2006) noted that the oligarch faction was less cohesive and more disorganised
than the Medician faction. From our analysis it is seen that there are more brokerage
opportunities in the oligarchic faction highlighting that they were more disjunctured. We
see that 34 of the oligarchs are middlemen against
3
7 of the families in the Medician faction.
An additional remark is that the Medici attained control in Florence because they not
only brokered relationships between elite families in the network, but because they brokered
relationships between two opposing factions. Therefore, they were not only able to gather
and intercept information between the factions and use it to their advantage. This is the
prerogative of middlemen in social networks; to not only intercept information between
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Figure 6: Krackhardt’s network of advice among managers.
agents, but to manipulate and exploit it.
5.2 Middlemen in Krackhardt’s advice network
Next we consider an example of a well-known organisational advice network in which
Krackhardt (1987) investigated the relationships between managers in a given firm.6 He
considered an organisation of about 100 employees and 21 managers. Krackhardt collected
information from the managers about who sought advice from whom, depicted in Figure 6
on page 22. An arc from i to j denotes that manager i has sought advice from manager j;
therefore, an arc from j to i denotes that manager j has provided advice to manager i. In
this depiction the size of the node reflects its in-degree.
In Table 4, using the same centrality measures as before, we identify two weak mid-
dlemen, managers 4 and 15, and one strong middleman, manager 21.7 Middlemen are
important for this network for a number of intuitive reasons: First, a middleman can block
ideas, advice, and information from being transmitted from one group of managers to
another. Second, a middleman can manipulate the information transferred from one group
of managers to another.
The weak middleman, Node 15, has the highest brokerage in the organisation controlling
6We use data in the “LAS” matrix from p.129 in the Krackhardt article as it seems to be the most objective
measure.
7As before, (*) indicates a weak middleman and (**) indicates a strong middleman.
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Manager d−i (d
+
i ) Ei BCi νi ν
∗
i
1 12 (4) 0.068 0.035 0.000 0.000
2 18 (2) 0.306 0.011 0.000 0.000
3 3 (9) 1.271 0.018 0.000 0.000
4(*) 6 (7) 1.001 0.071 0.090 0.034
5 3 (10) 1.463 0.009 0.000 0.000
6 0 (1) 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 11 (6) 0.776 0.048 0.000 0.000
8 1 (7) 1.013 0.001 0.000 0.000
9 4 (9) 1.171 0.011 0.000 0.000
10 8 (5) 0.820 0.018 0.000 0.000
11 9 (3) 0.344 0.004 0.000 0.000
12 3 (1) 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000
13 0 (6) 0.938 0.000 0.000 0.000
14 10 (4) 0.625 0.002 0.000 0.000
15(*) 3 (9) 1.265 0.092 0.161 0.064
16 0 (4) 0.580 0.000 0.000 0.000
17 0 (5) 0.673 0.000 0.000 0.000
18 15 (12) 1.745 0.231 0.000 0.000
19 2 (10) 1.493 0.002 0.000 0.000
20 6 (7) 1.028 0.028 0.000 0.000
21(**) 15 (8) 1.348 0.176 0.147 0.051
Table 4: Influence, centrality, and middlemen in Krackhardt’s advice network
a total of 34 relationships. This is also reflected in that Krackhardt (1987) highlighted
manager 15 as an important agent in the organisational advice network. However, Node 15
does not have the highest betweenness or Bonacich centralities. Instead, Node 18 is the
most prominent in terms of Bonacich and betweenness scores but is not a middleman in the
network; instead this may be a function of the node 18’s in- and out-degree.
Both Bonacich and betweenness centralities are also seen to be poor indicators for
ranking middlemen: Node 15 is the most powerful middleman in the network, but has a
Bonacich and betweenness centrality lower than Node 21. The Bonacich influence model
does not consider the fact that middlemen are potentially able to exploit their position by
using information from others and blocking the transmission of certain information and
ideas.
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Appendix: Algorithm for calculating middleman power
We can calculate the network power of a node from the adjacency matrix using a multi-stage
algorithm. The first algorithm used is provided below using the MATLAB programming
language.8
Language: MATLAB
Input: Adjacency Matrix (D)
Output: Raw (NP) and normalised (np) network power of individual nodes
Function: [NP,np] = middleman_power(D)
1 D = ’insert adjacency matrix’;
2 n = size(D,1);
3 Z = zeros(n);
4 OUT = cumsum(D,2);
5 D1 = Z;
6 for i=1:n
7 D1 = D1 + logical(Dˆi);
8 D1=logical(D1);
9 end
10 D1(logical(eye(size(D1)))) = 0;
11 B = sum(transpose(D1));
12 B_all = sum(B);
13 DT = transpose(D);
14 DT1 = Z;
15 for i=1:n
16 DT1 = DT1 + logical(DTˆi);
17 DT1=logical(DT1);
18 end
19 DT1(logical(eye(size(DT1)))) = 0;
20 C = sum(transpose(DT1));
21 C_all = sum(C);
22 for i=1:n
23 Ptwo(i,1) = B(i) - OUT(i,n);
24 end
25 Ptwo = max(sum(Ptwo),1);
26 for i=1:n
27 G = D;
28 G(:,i)=0;
29 G(i,:)=0;
30 GG = zeros(n);
31 for j=1:n
32 GG = GG + logical(Gˆj);
33 GG = logical(GG);
34 end
35 GG(logical(eye(size(GG)))) = 0;
36 B_2 = sum(transpose(GG));
37 B_2_all = sum(B_2);
38 NP(i,1) = B_all - B_2_all - (B(i) + C(i));
39 end
40 np = NP/Ptwo;
The second step is to characterise each node. From Theorem 2.5 and Corollary 2.6, the
distinction between weak and strong middlemen is easy to make. This allows us to enhance
the algorithm for identifying the various classes of critical nodes in a network.
We first analyse the network power of the nodes in the directed network provided using
the above algorithm. We then investigate the middleman power measure for the underlying
undirected network. If a node has positive middleman power in the original network as well
as a positive network power in the underlying network, then the node has to be a strong
middleman. On the other hand, if the node has a positive middleman power in the original
8The devised algorithm is general enough to be configured for any programming language.
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network, but zero middleman power in the underlying undirected network, that node has to
be a weak middleman.
This is shown in the extended algorithm below.
Language: MATLAB
Input: Adjacency matrix, D, and raw network power, NP.
Output: Middleman classification.
1 U = D + transpose(D);
2 U = logical(U);
3 U1 = Z;
4 for i=1:n
5 U1 = U1 + logical(Uˆi);
6 U1 = logical(U1);
7 end
8 U1(logical(eye(size(U1)))) = 0;
9 F = sum(transpose(U1));
10 F_all = sum(F);
11 for i=1:n
12 G = U;
13 G(:,i)=0;
14 G(i,:)=0;
15 GG = zeros(n);
16 for j=1:n
17 GG = GG + logical(Gˆj);
18 GG = logical(GG);
19 end
20 GG(logical(eye(size(GG)))) = 0;
21 F_2 = sum(transpose(GG));
22 F_2_all = sum(F_2);
23 NPU(i,1) = F_all - F_2_all - (F(i) + F(i));
24 end
25 for i=1:n
26 if NP(i) == 0 && NPU(i) == 0;
27 fprintf(’Node %0.0f is a non-middleman\n’,i);
28 elseif NP(i) > 0 && NPU(i) == 0;
29 fprintf(’Node %0.0f is a weak middleman\n’,i);
30 elseif NP(i) > 0 && NPU(i) > 0;
31 fprintf(’Node %0.0f is a strong middleman\n’,i);
32 end
33 end
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